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Abstract
I articulate and employ a situational boundary-making approach to 
study the emergence of organization and technology at a shelter dur-
ing Hurricane Katrina. My analysis of qualitative data shows how emer-
gent organization occurred at the shelter as situational entanglements 
consisting of three main elements: a salient moment in time, key actors, 
and boundary-making practices. Key actors’ responses to salient mo-
ments in time enacted both distinction and dependency between organi-
zational and technological actors, resulting in a divided organization. This 
analysis extends emergent approaches by showing how organization 
and technology are situationally organized and emerges through the 
(in)determinacy of meaning. Implications are also discussed for disaster man-
agers to assess the success and failure of technology during a response.
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In the summer of 2005, over 10,000 Hurricane Katrina evacuees arrived in 
the City of Jackson1 by the busloads, seeking refuge in the days prior to and 
following the disaster. Katrina left millions of Gulf Coast residents displaced 
from their homes and in serious need of food and shelter. City of Jackson 
officials responded to the onslaught of evacuees by opening one large shelter 
to house the many thousands arriving daily. Local businesses, community 
organizations, and a reported 13,000 individual volunteers came together to 
coordinate support and services at the shelter in a sustained relief attempt that 
lasted over 3 weeks.
This relief effort was the largest organization of people and resources that 
the City of Jackson had ever experienced. There was no prior plan in place, 
and there were no determined rules to follow. An overwhelming sense of 
urgency governed the decisions and interactions of the City of Jackson 
employees, local volunteer organizations, and community volunteers that 
organized the effort. Volunteers turned to technology in order to coordinate 
their efforts and connect evacuees to missing loved ones.
In this article, I investigate the emergence of organization and technology 
at the City of Jackson shelter. My analysis shows how emergence occurred at 
the shelter as situational entanglements consisting of three main elements: a 
salient moment in time, key actors, and boundary-making practices. Key 
actors at the shelter responded to salient moments in time, enacting both dis-
tinction and dependency between organizational and technological actors, 
resulting in a divided organization. Situational entanglement extends exist-
ing emergent approaches by showing how organization and technology are 
situationally organized and how emergence occurs through the (in)determi-
nacy of meaning. Situational entanglement also provides disaster managers 
guidance to assess the value of different actors and the success and failure of 
technology during a response.
In the following section, I first review the relevant literature on emergency 
and disaster management that usefully examines emergence as an empirical 
phenomenon, affecting and affected by the use of technology. However, I 
argue that this research provides limited guidance for understanding the rela-
tionship between technology and emergence as a conceptual phenomenon. 
To overcome these conceptual limitations, I draw on emergent approaches in 
organizational technology studies (Leonardi, 2007; Orlikowski, 2007, 2010). 
Next, I articulate the situational boundary-making approach and offer a set of 
research questions that guide the inquiry and analysis of qualitative data gath-
ered for this study. After explaining the methods of data gathering and analy-
sis, I present the results of the analysis. Finally, I conclude with a discussion 
on the theoretical and practical implications for organizational technology 
scholars and disaster management practitioners.
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Technology As a Coordination Mechanism  
in Disaster Management
Disasters often trigger emergent social behaviors and new organizational 
forms. Specifically, emergence is conceptualized in disaster research as a 
“convergence” of individuals and groups at the scene of a disaster (Drabek 
& McEntire, 2003). Stallings and Quarantelli (1985) found that during emer-
gence, organizations and individuals take on new tasks and relationships that 
exist outside of normal, routine behavior. Quarantelli (1966, 1996) devel-
oped a typology of organizations in disaster response that identified organi-
zational types by tasks and structures. Emergent organizations are those with 
both new structures and nonregular tasks.
Emergent organizations must share resources in unfamiliar ways that 
cross jurisdictional boundaries, and because of intense pressures to perform 
rapidly, problems often occur with inadequate interorganizational coordina-
tion and communication. Scholars and practitioners of disaster and emer-
gency management argue that new and emerging technologies have the 
potential to improve the management of emergence in crisis (Alexander, 
1997; Rodriguez, Wachtendorf, & Russell, 2004; Stephenson & Anderson, 
1997). As a coordinating mechanism in interorganizational networks, tech-
nology enables communication and sharing of information more effectively 
(for an exception, see Quarantelli, 1997).
The nature of technology as a coordinating mechanism is often depicted in 
one of two forms in this literature: technology as an “agent of change” or as 
an “object of change.” In the first form, technologies act as mechanisms that 
change forms of organizations in disaster response toward improved coordi-
nation. This perspective isolates technology as an important component in 
(re)configuring organizational forms because of information and communi-
cation technologies’ (ICTs) so-called transformative capabilities. In an exam-
ination of three case studies of disaster management, Riley and Meadows 
(1997) found that a flexible database system could potentially facilitate rapid, 
accurate information sharing between organizations. Gant (1996) studied 
how ICTs shaped disaster networks and concluded that ICTs may change 
networks’ level of centralization. Implicitly, technology becomes the mecha-
nism that may order the messiness of emergent disaster-relief efforts. This 
perspective tends to tilt toward technology to explain both stability and 
change (Jackson, Poole, & Kuhn, 2002) and draws on received views of tech-
nology as stable, fixed, and discrete, assuming the unproblematic nature of 
technical artifacts (Orlikowski & Iacono, 2001).
In the second form, technology is depicted as an object of change. Research 
that foregrounds the unique social and cultural practices of disaster response 
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organizations focuses on how to align technology implementation with orga-
nizational culture and structures. An alignment perspective suggests that it is 
possible and desirable to “match” affordances of technologies with existing or 
desired organizational practices or states. Banipal (2006) argued that careful 
integration of communication and information systems within disaster 
response organizations would develop more robust emergency communica-
tion systems. Comfort, Sungu, Johnson, and Dunn (2001) theorized how cer-
tain technological affordances of tools to support decision-making were better 
suited to match the desired self-organizing state of organizational systems. 
These approaches tend to tilt toward the social to explain the variability and 
stability of technology use (Jackson et al., 2002). As a result, technology may 
be reduced to affordances, as a functional tool designed to serve organiza-
tional processes.
Both agent of change and object of change approaches create limitations 
for understanding emergent organizational dynamics. Despite the promises 
of technology to facilitate interorganizational emergency response, disaster 
response organizations often use ICTs in an ad hoc fashion (Gant, 1996). Thus, 
technology as an “agent of change” to manage emergent behavior may not fully 
account for the effects that often unpredictable emergent behavior may have on 
technology use. In addition, technology as an “object of change” that seeks to 
align technological affordances with organizational cultures and structures may 
oversimplify the function of technology in emergent disaster situations.
In summary, disaster and emergency management research usefully directs 
our attention to emergence as an empirical phenomenon affecting and affected 
by the use of technology. However, this research provides less guidance for 
understanding the relationship between technology and emergence as a con-
ceptual phenomenon. To overcome the limitations of “agent of change” and 
“object of change” approaches to technology, I employ a situational boundary-
making approach to study the emergence of organization and technology in 
disaster response. In the following section, I introduce the conceptual basis of 
this approach by situating it alongside related approaches in organizational 
technology studies.
Approaches to Organization and Technology  
as Emergent
Organizational scholars have embraced an emergent conceptual focus for 
explaining the relationship between organization and technology (Leonardi, 
2007; Leonardi & Barley, 2008; Orlikowski, 2007, 2010). Rather than 
approaching technology as a coordination mechanism between organizations, 
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an emergent conceptual focus is used to examine how social structures and 
technologies are enacted and reciprocally intertwined in organizational prac-
tices. The basic assumptions of emergent conceptual approaches are that (a) 
neither technology nor organization is foregrounded a priori, (b) human and 
technological agencies temporally emerge, and (c) technological and organi-
zational changes are mutually constitutive.
To define these emergent approaches, it is useful to compare them with 
existing structurational approaches in organizational technology studies 
(Giddens, 1986). Emergent approaches differ in two main ways from earlier 
structurational approaches (Orlikowski, 1992; Poole & Desanctis, 1990). 
First, instead of structures embedded in the technologies themselves, early 
emergent approaches showed how structures of technology were enacted 
through recurrent interaction (Orlikowski, 2000). “Every engagement with a 
technology is temporally and contextually provisional and any structure is 
always an ongoing accomplishment that results from everyday practices” 
(Orlikowski, 2000, p. 412). Second, instead of locating agency solely within 
the human actor, more recent emergent approaches have theorized a rela-
tional agency between technologies and human actors (Leonardi, 2007; 
Orlikowski, 2007, 2010).2
However, exactly how technological and human actors interrelate differs 
across this emerging literature. On the one hand, scholars have adopted an 
analytic focus on the reciprocal interaction between human and technological 
actors (Leonardi, 2007; Pickering, 1995). This approach assumes that organi-
zational practice is goal-oriented, recursive, and that the use of technol ogy 
has a patterned nature. This patterned use of technology then shapes social 
arrangements and organizational structures over time. Leonardi (2007) exam-
ined the reciprocal interaction between humans and technologies by isolating 
how material features of technology, which become affordances in use, shaped 
the social structure of organizations. In a study of information technology (IT) 
use, he found that information enabled by IT led to changes in informal advice 
networks in an organization. Through the activation of the technology’s mate-
rial affordances in practice, the organization’s social structure was transformed 
from its previously rigid hierarchical form (Leonardi, 2007).
On the other hand, scholars have also adopted an analytic focus on the 
constitutive entanglement of human and technological actors (Barad, 2007; 
Orlikowski, 2007, 2010). This approach assumes that organizational prac-
tices consist of an inextricable relationship between the social and material, 
such that a priori demarcation of technologies from humans is not necessary. 
Orlikowski (2010) argued that human and technological actors are always 
relational, performed in “sociomaterial” assemblages. She argued that the 
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entanglement of different sociomaterial agencies always makes some organi-
zational practices and knowledge more salient than others. As such, technolo-
gies are parts of sociomaterial assemblages that enact boundaries to make 
some actors more meaningful than others.
In summary, recent approaches in organizational technology studies theo-
rize emergence as relationships enacted in organizational practices through 
different forms of shared agency. I now combine the conceptual insights of 
these scholars with the empirical insights of disaster and emergency manage-
ment research. In the next section, I articulate this combination as the situa-
tional boundary-making approach, which I then use to examine the emergence 
of technology and organization in disaster response.
The Situational Boundary-Making Approach
The situational boundary-making approach has two aims: (1) to apply an 
emergent conceptual focus to study organizational and technological emer-
gence in disaster response and (2) to use the empirical context of emergence 
in disaster response to inform and extend existing emergent conceptual 
approaches. To this end, the approach specifies two important aspects of 
emergence for the analyst’s attention: the situation as the focal point for 
selecting and discerning which actors matter in emergence and attention to 
shared agency as a form of boundary-making.
First, based on disaster response research, we know that uses of technol-
ogy in emergent organizations ad hoc (Gant, 1996). In addition, what form 
an organization takes in this context cannot be taken for granted (Drabek & 
McEntire, 2003; Quarantelli, 1996). However, reciprocal interaction and 
constitutive entanglement approaches to emergence have so far either 
examined relatively routine organizational uses of technology or the use of 
technology in relatively well-established organizations or organizational 
practices. However, to study emergence in disaster response, an approach is 
needed that does not take the stability of organization or organizational prac-
tices for granted. To this end, I articulate the situation as the focal point for 
selecting and discerning which agencies matter in emergence. This focal 
point starts with a grounded approach wherein changing situational circum-
stances are significant to conceptualizing emergence. This focus embraces 
the unpredictability of disaster response, where organizational actors and 
technologies are directed toward addressing often unknown and quickly 
evolving problems.
Second, we know based on reciprocal interaction and constitutive entangle-
ment approaches  that agency is relational, shared between different actors. 
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Differences in theorizing this relationality are important for defining which 
aspects of technology and organization the analyst chooses to highlight. 
Reciprocal interaction approaches focus on technological affordances and 
recurrent practices, while constitutive entanglement approaches focus on 
sociomaterial practices. However, in order to study emergence with a situa-
tional focal point, I theorize relationships between agencies specifically as 
boundary-making.3 The analyst starts with the assumption that for every 
meaningful and determinant agency, there is always an agency that is made 
indeterminate, or part of the “constitutive outside” to what is made meaningful 
(Barad, 2007). Boundary-making embraces the variable agency of emergent 
approaches but focuses the analyst on one particular dynamic of relationality: 
inclusion and exclusion.
In summary, the situational boundary-making approach brings together 
conceptual approaches on emergence in organizational technology studies 
with empirical studies of emergence in disaster research to inform one 
another. In particular, elements of the situation become a primary focal point 
for selecting and discerning which agencies matter. Furthermore, the rela-
tionship between actors is a process of boundary-making, wherein some 
actors are always excluded to the inclusion of others. I employed this 
approach to study the emergence of technology and organization in disaster 
response, asking the following research questions:
RQ1: How does situational boundary-making occur in emergent disas-
ter response efforts?
RQ2: How do situational boundary-making practices shape the design 
and use of technology?
Next, I describe the research context of this study and provide details 
on the research site and methods employed to answer the research 
questions.
Research Context
Hurricane Katrina was one of the largest and deadliest natural disasters in 
United States history (Knabb, Rhome, & Brown, 2005). The impact of 
Katrina reached from Florida to Louisiana, causing damage in all of the Gulf 
Coast states. In New Orleans, the breach of levees submerged parts of the city, 
requiring an emergency evacuation of thousands of residents. Some 137,000 
of these residents evacuated to the southern state that is the focus of this 
study. In particular, the City of Jackson opened a large shelter for a period of 
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3 weeks and provided food and clothing to almost 4,000 Katrina evacuees 
through donations and efforts of almost 6,000 volunteers (Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, 2006).
Opening this shelter required the cooperative efforts of multiple organiza-
tions and volunteers. The local Office of Homeland Security and Emergency 
Management (HSEM) officially “activated” the shelter on the Friday after 
Katrina made landfall. Volunteer organizations prepared the shelter for evac-
uees’ arrival by securing food, water, cots, and other services at the shelter 
such as showers and clothing. First responders were on hand to perform med-
ical triage and ensure security at the shelter. See the appendix for a descrip-
tion of the main parties involved in the response at this shelter.
While food and cots were being secured, volunteers also set up several 
technologies at the shelter. Computers and online technologies were used for 
two main functions at the shelter. First, volunteers set up a bank of 20 donated 
computers to handle the “intake” of evacuees. To identify evacuees and 
improve security at the shelter, an intake database was designed by these vol-
unteers to receive and record the information of evacuees who stayed at the 
shelter. Second, volunteers also set up a bank of “public” computers exclu-
sively for evacuees to use to search for missing loved ones using an online 
people-finding site, also designed by volunteers.
The technology volunteers and the technologies they designed and deployed 
at the shelter are the focus of this study. The parties involved in technology 
deployment and design at the shelter included the city’s Department of 
Communications and Technology Management (CTM), the large nonprofit 
organization Health Plus, local university technology developers, local tech-
nology vendors, and individual technology volunteers. These different organi-
zations and groups converged at the shelter to form an emergent organization 
(Drabek & McEntire, 2003). They had little to no prior experience working 
together, and the technology applications they implemented did not exist the 
day before the response. Rather, both the working relationships between vol-
unteers and the technology applications they implemented were designed 
during the first days of the response.
Method
Interviews
Through in-depth interviewing, I gathered descriptions and interpretations 
about volunteer practices during and after the Hurricane Katrina response. I 
contacted 28 technology volunteers, of which 22 agreed to be interviewed. 
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Five were CTM employees for the city, three were volunteers representing 
large technology firms, and 14 were individual technology volunteers with 
experience working in the high-tech industry in software development, 
Website design, database engineering, and IT security. With the exception of 
only one person, all of my participants volunteered during the response to 
Hurricane Katrina. Their experience of volunteering as part of an emergent 
organization at the shelter was desirable for my aims to study the emergence 
of organization and technology in disaster response. Eight of the participants 
were female and 14 were male.
The style of qualitative interviewing I employed can be characterized as a 
conversation with a purpose. These interviews ranged in length from 30 
minutes to 2 hours. The majority of the interviews were conducted face-to-
face at the individual’s place of work or at a public location such as a coffee 
shop or restaurant. When it was not possible to meet in person, I conducted 
the interviews over the telephone. I used a basic guide in all of the interviews, 
although most conversations expanded in a number of directions from the 
initial interview questions.
The questions asked participants to describe their practices as volunteers in 
response to Hurricane Katrina and to reflect on their volunteering experiences. 
They were also asked how the design and use of technology was conducted 
among the various actors at the shelter. Broad and open-ended questions stim-
ulated discussion on these issues without limiting the range of appropriate 
topics. Tape-recorded conversations were transcribed for analysis, resulting in 
approximately 230 single-spaced, typed pages. In addition, I took detailed 
notes to accompany the recorded interviews.
Participant Observation
I also observed four post-response meet ings. These meetings took place 
over a 4-month span in the spring of 2006. The purpose of the meetings 
was for technology volunteers to discuss lessons learned from the Katrina 
response and develop strategies for future technology deployment. These 
meetings allowed me to observe the “talk” of organizational members. I 
gained insight into collective sensemaking processes, which are central 
to how organizational members understand the reality of organizational 
life (Weick, 1995). Throughout this process, I took scratch notes and in 
some cases headnotes, which I immediately typed into field notes 
(Lindlof & Taylor, 2002). These activities resulted in 10 hours of partici-
pant observation.
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Listserv Archives
I was also given access to an e-mail listserv that was created during the 
Katrina response to coordinate the volunteers at the shelter. This listserv was 
publicly available online, but I was invited to analyze this data by the listserv 
host, whom I also interviewed for this study. Messages on the listserv 
spanned from September 2005 to July 2006, with a total of 244 volunteers 
subscribed to the list at its peak usage from various volunteer groups and 
organizations. To learn more about volunteer practices during the disaster 
response, I analyzed only the messages from September 2005 posted during 
the actual response at the shelter. These data consisted of 220 individual mes-
sages posted over the course of 20 days by 70 individual authors.
I compared and triangulated the three types of data used: interview tran-
scripts, field notes from participant observations, and messages from the list-
serv. Cross-referencing each of these three sources increases the validity of 
the study (Taylor & Trujillo, 2001).
Data Analysis
I employed a version of the constant comparative method of qualitative 
research (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Using the com-
puter software N6, I first coded the data, engaging in a process of open cod-
ing, which is the initial, unrestricted coding of data (Strauss, 1987). Codes 
serve to mark meaningful data and begin the process of building categories 
(Lindlof & Taylor, 2002). This form of unrestricted coding was used to 
identify emergent situational elements, actors, and technologies that were 
important at the shelter. This open-coding process resulted in a total of 122 
codes.
Codes that identified situational elements captured the salient aspects of 
the situation. For example, codes such as “lack of leadership” and “lack of 
systems” identified important situational challenges that emerged from the 
data. Codes that identified important actors at the shelter captured the qualities 
of actors and their practices during the response. For example, codes such as 
“proactive” versus “reactive” identified important differences in the practices 
of actors that emerged from the data. Finally, codes that identified important 
technologies at the shelter captured the aspects of technology design and use. 
For example, codes such as “problem solving” and “fixing failure” identified 
design and uses of technology that emerged from the data.
Next, I arranged the codes, when applicable, into a timeline. This timeline 
was used to identify significant events that occurred during the response and 
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which situational elements, actors, and technologies were important to those 
events. For example, I used the timeline to identify the first hours of the 
response as a significant event for volunteer practices at the shelter, during 
which technology’s main role was responsiveness to immediate situational 
demands. The timeline showed how technology during this time period was 
distinct in time from the same technology in a subsequent time period. This 
step of analysis was used to develop the situational focus of the situational 
boundary-making approach.
Finally, I interpreted and arranged the codes into broader categories. 
This process of integration produces deeper meanings by drawing out rela-
tionships between codes (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002). Specifically, the process 
of integration was used to develop an understanding of the relationships 
between situational elements, actors, and technologies. For example, I used 
integration to identify a relationship between the responsiveness of technol-
ogy and a type of responsive volunteer practice at the shelter that occurred 
in the first hours of the response. I categorized these codes together under a 
representative category “responsive practices under extraordinary situa-
tional demands.”
However, integration also allowed me to notice which codes were not 
associated with each other. I used this to identify excluded elements and 
develop an interpretation about the role of exclusion in the process of emer-
gence. For example, I identified the exclusion of reactive volunteer practices 
at the shelter that occurred during the first hours of the response. I catego-
rized these codes together into a representative category named “reactive 
practices under extraordinary situational demands.” This step was used to 
develop the boundary-making focus of the situational boundary-making 
approach. Next, I present the conceptual scheme resulting from this analysis 
called situational entanglement.
Situational Entanglement
City of Jackson volunteers converged within hours of Hurricane Katrina to 
deploy technology at the shelter, forming an emergent organization. This 
analysis will show how organizational and technological emergence in disas-
ter response occurred through situational entanglements, consisting of three 
main elements: a salient moment in time, key actors, and boundary-making 
practices. The entanglement process will show how key actors’ responses to 
salient moments in time enacted both distinction and dependency between 
organizational and technological actors. These boundary-making practices 
defined the situation at the shelter, resulting in an emergent organization 
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marked by a divide between actors. In the next section, I present the situa-
tional entanglement as it occurred at the City of Jackson shelter.
The City of Jackson Situational Entanglement
Two salient moments in time comprised the focal points for City of Jackson 
volunteers at the shelter. The first salient moment occurred during the initial 
hours of the response when volunteers faced extraordinary situational 
demands. During this time, volunteers experienced significant pressure and 
uncertainty at the shelter. The second salient moment occurred around the 
second day of the response, when volunteers faced compounded situational 
demands. During this time, volunteers experienced the failure of the tech-
nologies they had initially designed.
These two salient moments in time triggered key actors’ boundary-making 
practices. First, I found that under extraordinary situational demands, volun-
teers responded in distinctly different ways. Some volunteers responded 
quickly to situational demands with the design and deployment of responsive 
technologies while other volunteers waited to take action. Second, I found that 
when the technology later failed, and compounded the situational demands, 
the investment in responsive technologies increased as additional volunteers 
and technologies were enrolled to fix the failed technology.
These boundary-making practices enacted distinction and dependency 
between key actors. First, an early distinction was enacted between volun-
teers and technologies at the shelter that were responsive versus volunteers 
and technologies that were reactive to the initial extraordinary demands. 
Second, after responding to the compounded situational demands created by 
the failure of responsive technology, a dependency was enacted between vol-
unteers and responsive technologies at the shelter.
The enactment of distinction and dependency between organizational and 
technological actors defined the situation at the shelter, resulting in a divided 
organization. On the one hand, responsive volunteers and technologies co-
emerged to gain control of the situation at the shelter, becoming defining actors. 
On the other hand, reactive volun teers became exterior to the developing situ-
ation at the shelter and soon became isolated actors. See Figure 1 for an illustra-
tion of the process of situational entanglement at the City of Jackson shelter.
In the next section, I present two illustrations of the City of Jackson situ-
ational entanglement. The first illustration shows the dynamics of situational 
entanglement as they occurred during the development of an evacuee intake 
technology at the shelter. The second illustration shows the same dynamics, 
but as they occurred through the development of online tools for evacuees to 
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search for missing loved ones. See Table 1 for a breakdown of the elements 
of situational entanglement for each illustration.
Illustration One: Evacuee Intake
In the first uncertain hours of the response, volunteers from the City of 
Jackson, Health Plus, and other technology volunteers struggled to develop a 
system for keeping a record of evacuee information upon their arrival at the 
shelter. Though most volunteers at the shelter were eager to take action, no 
single person or organization was stepping into place as a leader at the shelter. 
Tanya, a volunteer that worked at the intake table for the city, recalled how 
uncertain the situation was during the first hours of that Friday night: “I think 
one of the biggest things was no one could figure out who was in charge. It was 
just chaos constantly.” Furthermore, none of the organizations at the shelter 
had a technology for evacuee intake. Dana, a technology volunteer working at 
the intake tables, explained her surprise that Health Plus did not already have 
a system in place. “This is a huge, old, national organization. You would think 
they would have some technical skills somewhere. They don’t. And it just 
surprised the heck out of everybody.” There was no intake system at the shelter 
and thousands of evacuees were arriving in need of assistance.
Under these extraordinary situational circumstances, volunteers responded 
in distinctly different ways. Initially, most volunteers assumed that Health 
Plus would provide the leadership to direct the evacuee intake at the shelter. 
However, rather than direction, most volunteers recalled how Health Plus 
reacted to the situation with paralyzing inaction. Gary, a technology volunteer 
Figure 1. The process of situational entanglement at the City of Jackson shelter.
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Table 1. Elements of Situational Entanglement by Illustration
Elements of 
entanglement Illustration one Illustration two
First salient moment in time
 Extraordinary 
situational demands
Leadership vacuum at 
shelter intake. Absence 
of an intake system.
Evacuees lost loved ones. 
Absence of a system to 
connect missing loved 
ones.
 Practices enacting 
distinction of reactive 
volunteers
Health Plus was paralyzed 
with inaction.
City of Jackson and 
Health Plus prohibited 
connections. Health Plus 
took delayed action.
 Practices enacting 
distinction of 
responsive 
volunteers
City of Jackson and 
technology volunteers 
quickly designed a 
custom database.
Technology volunteers 
quickly set up public 
computers and online 
tools.
Second salient moment in time
 Compounded 
situational demands
Physical presence and 
record in the database 
no longer corresponded. 
Crashing database.
Proliferation of people-
finding posts/forums 
overwhelmed evacuees.
 Practices enacting 
dependency 
on responsive 
technologies
Fixing the failed database 
increased volunteers’ 
investment in the 
system.
Fixing the failed online 
tools increased 
evacuees’ reliance on 
the system.
Resulting divided emergent organization 
 Defining actors City of Jackson technology 
volunteers and the 
database co-emerged 
to gain control of the 
situation, acting as a leader 
of intake at the shelter.
Technology volunteers 
and the centralized 
online tools co-emerged 
to provide evacuees 
control of the situation.
 Isolated actors Health Plus was sidelined 
from the efforts of the 
City of Jackson and 
technology volunteers.
Health Plus did not 
recognize the need 
technology volunteers 
were meeting.
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working on evacuee intake, described his experience of Health Plus volun-
teers in the first hours of the response: “I remember Dana and I running 
around trying to find the person responsible and the answer from Health Plus 
was, ‘We’ll be able to tell you who that person is in about four hours or so.’” 
Dana described the initial “lack of action” from Health Plus as “criminal,” 
while Tanya elaborated that “it was a mess—they [Health Plus] were just a 
complete nightmare.”
However, some volunteers were responsive to the extraordinary demands 
in the first few hours of the response. Volunteers from the City of Jackson and 
other technology volunteers responded to the extraordinary situational 
demands by designing a new intake database on the spot in the shelter. Peg, a 
city volunteer, described their practices: “We grabbed TVs, printers, fax 
machines, and some laptops. We just grabbed 50 of the computers from our 
training room so that acted as our [shelter’s] first supply.” Dana recalled the 
intake system they had set up within hours: “They had 20 computers set up. 
There was a volunteer, a computer, and an evacuee sitting in front of you and 
you were taking their information. It had lots of questions in this database, 
and for two days, 24 hours a day, people were coming to the shelter that 
needed to be put in this database.” Gary shared his reaction to the swiftness 
of responsive volunteers. “That Friday night, the fact that they had a system 
up and running was miraculous.”
However, by Saturday, the newly designed intake database had already 
begun to fail as circumstances at the shelter began to change. Evacuees’ phys-
ical presence in the shelter no longer correlated with their records in the data-
base. Tanya recalled the circumstances of the database failure:
First, we started giving them [evacuees] wristbands with numbers, and 
we thought, “Oh this is a great idea.” You have a number [from the 
database] and you associated the number with their [evacuees’] cot, so 
we knew where they were physically located on the floor. The problem 
was they’d take showers and they’d fall off. Then we would give them 
another number so we would have seven different entries in the data-
base for Joe Smith, and we could never keep track of which was the 
correct number.
By Saturday morning, volunteers on the volunteer message forum had 
declared the database a “toxic waste dump” and volunteers reported the data-
base was “crashing” regularly.
Volunteers at intake were now faced with responding to a new demand 
created by the failed technology. Ironically, the failure of the database did not 
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undermine the efforts of the City of Jackson and the technology volunteers. 
Instead, volunteers’ investment in fixing the system only increased their 
dependency on the system. In order to fix the failed technology, new volun-
teers were specifically recruited to develop a system to work around the 
failed database and then merge the new data back into the repaired system. 
Fifty volunteers were tasked with collecting and correcting the evacuee data 
manually using Excel spreadsheets. Dana recalled the grueling process: 
“They had a special little area for people to take the Excel spreadsheets, 
which were so long, and they had them all taped together. People took these 
Excel spreadsheets and had to re-enter them all by hand.” Volunteers invested 
hundreds of hours into the recovery of the system and transfer of the evacuee 
data back into the repaired database.
As volunteers became more invested in fixing the intake system, the City 
of Jackson volunteers, with the database, soon gained control, leading the 
intake at the shelter. Gary, a technology volunteer reflected on this moment: 
“The fact that the city was able to build a database, even if it was kind of 
jerry-rigged, they did the job they were able to do, and the fact that they were 
able to get it up and running so quickly was fabulous.”
However, once responsive volunteers and technologies had taken control 
of the intake situation at the shelter, Health Plus, who had already reacted to 
the situation with inaction, had become completely sidelined from any fur-
ther involvement with the efforts of the City of Jackson and technology vol-
unteers. Dana talked about her recognition of this separation between the 
volunteers’ efforts:
What we thought was happening, was that this information [in the 
database] was getting into the big Health Plus or FEMA database in the 
sky or something. By the second day, it started dawning on me that I 
should ask, you know. “What can we tell people? Where did this infor-
mation go? Who knows at a federal level where’s it going? Oh, it’s not 
going anywhere; it’s the city’s information. It’s the city’s database.” 
And I thought, “So how does anybody know who’s here at the federal 
level,” and it’s like, “Well, they don’t.”
By the second day of the response, Health Plus volunteers were largely 
uninvolved in the design of evacuee intake.
Illustration Two: Online People-Finding
Evacuees were brought to the City of Jackson shelter by the busloads from 
New Orleans and surrounding areas. In the process of evacuation, many 
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families were separated from each other as they were loaded onto different 
buses or taken to shelters at different times. A technology vendor, Brad, 
described how uncertain the situation was for evacuees: “There were a lot of 
people who were lost. You know, ‘Where is mother? She got on a bus 3 hours 
ago. Where did it go? I have no idea.’” Many evacuees had no way to com-
municate with loved ones they had been separated from and volunteers were 
not sure how to reconnect people. Rachel, a technology volunteer explained, 
“In Katrina, they did not know where a lot of people were. Loved ones were 
calling and no one could track them down or tell them if they were alive, if 
they were well, or even if they were in [the city].”
Under these extraordinary situational circumstances, volunteers responded 
in distinctly different ways. Initially, both Health Plus and the City of Jackson 
volunteers had actually created barriers to evacuees making connections. 
Even though the City of Jackson volunteers had gathered evacuee information 
during shelter intake, that system was not made accessible for people finding. 
Furthermore, Health Plus was unwilling to confirm the identity of evacuees at 
the shelter over the phone. Gary, a technology volunteer, explained this prob-
lem on the volunteer listserve: “One of the Health Plus folks told me this 
evening that when folks call into the Center to find loved ones, for privacy/
safety reasons they can’t say whether a person is in the shelter or not.” Once 
the problem became apparent to Health Plus, they started an initiative to orga-
nize the location information of evacuees, but could not complete it fast 
enough. Danny, a technology volunteer explained his interactions with the 
new Health Plus system: “Health Plus kept sending mixed signals. Everyone 
would be told to stop working and put their data into the official site, except 
that it is not up and you waited another day and nothing happens.”
However, some volunteers were responsive to the extraordinary demands 
in the first few hours of the response. Technology volunteers began setting up 
“public computers” at the shelter that evacuees could use to e-mail and search 
the Internet. Technology volunteers knew that people outside of the shelter, 
all over the country, were posting inquiries and whereabouts of evacuees 
online. Online postings, forums, and e-mails were quickly designed and 
deployed to meet the extraordinary situational demand. Kim, a technology 
volunteer, explained, “There were Web sites nationwide put up. They [evacu-
ees] can list themselves as being here [at the shelter], and people could actu-
ally search to see if they could find them.” Jan, another technology volunteer, 
recalled the initial success of the technologies, “I think it was a real eye 
opener for people that they could use technology to find family members.”
However, after the first hours, the online tools began to fail. A prolifera-
tion of web postings and “people finding” websites overwhelmed evacuees 
searching for loved ones online. Danny, a technology volunteer, explained 
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this problem: “That’s not a very useful thing to do if you’re looking for your 
uncle; you have to know where all 20 sites are and search each one of them, 
and if you happen to miss the one that your uncle is listed on, you’re screwed.” 
Because of the proliferation of sites, a new problem arose: How, in the sea of 
information, could someone locate the actual presence of the evacuee? A 
technology volunteer, Jack, shared this story about the problems caused by 
the technologies on the volunteer listserve:
The mish-mash and mixups of multiple [people-finding] databases being 
used are taking a toll. Poor Randy, we sent him to San Anapolis yester-
day to bring his wife back from the shelter. She was gone when he got 
there. Nobody knew where. This morning she shows up on the Katrina 
Locater List, but not on the Family Link List. I really feel for him.
Volunteers were now faced with responding to a new demand to fix the 
failed technology.
Ironically, the failure of the online tools did not undermine the efforts of 
the technology volunteers. Instead, volunteers began investing more effort 
into fixing the online tools, which only increased their dependency on the 
technology. Technology volunteers began directing the efforts of additional 
volunteers and technologies toward centralizing the online people-finding 
information. Danny described how, within days, they had organized thou-
sands of online volunteers to create a solution:
Over the weekend we had 3,000 volunteers going over things like 
Craig’s list and hand entering all the posts from Craig’s list as unstruc-
tured data. And we had hackers going through all the structured data 
converting that into the people-finder interchange format that we 
developed over the holiday weekend.
After the interchange of the data into one single format had been com-
pleted, technology volunteers and online people-finding sites were able to 
help evacuees find missing loved ones. Evacuees became increasingly reliant 
on these technologies to locate and communicate with their loved ones. Dana 
described a technology volunteer making a successful connection: “Valarie 
helped this older man set up his e-mail address and search the sites. He came 
back the next day and he had forgotten how to check it [e-mail] and when she 
helped him check it he had three e-mails from family and friends who were 
looking for him!” As volunteers and evacuees became more reliant on the 
system, the technology volunteers and the online technologies co-emerged to 
provide evacuees a sense of control at the shelter.
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However, once technology volunteers and online tools began to connect 
evacuees with missing loved ones at the shelter, Health Plus, who had already 
reacted to the situation with prohibitive or delayed responses, seemed unable 
to understand the efforts of the thousands of technology volunteers who cre-
ated the people-finding site. Technology volunteers recalled their failed 
efforts to seek collaboration from Health Plus. Danny explained,
My impression right now is that they [Health Plus] don’t necessarily 
understand the concept of what we did, massively paralleling an all-
volunteer, all-Internet-based kind of immediate response. They don’t 
quite get it, and therefore it is very hard for us to be in a position to 
coordinate it. Which is what we needed badly—we needed that coor-
dination from some of the official disaster-relief folks, the Health Plus 
or FEMA or somebody else.
In summary, these two illustrations showed how the dynamics of situa-
tional entanglement occurred at the City of Jackson shelter. In response to 
extraordinary situational demands, volunteers became distinct as either 
responsive or reactive through their practices. Reactive volunteers responded 
to the situation with inaction or delay, while responsive volunteers responded 
to extraordinary situational demands through the design of responsive tech-
nologies. However, responsive technologies eventually failed, creating new, 
compounded situational demands. As volunteers invested more effort into 
fixing the failed technology, they became more dependent on these technolo-
gies. After the increased investment, responsive volunteers and technologies 
co-emerged to gain control over the situation and, as a result, to have a defin-
ing role at the shelter. However, reactive volunteers did not respond quickly 
enough to situational demands and, after situational demands compounded, 
became isolated from the efforts of defining actors at the shelter. In the next 
section, I discuss the implications of situational entanglement for organiza-
tional technology theory and disaster response practice.
Discussion
The purpose of this study was to articulate and employ a situational boundary-
making approach to examine the emergence of organization and technology in 
disaster response. Using this approach to study the emergent organization at 
the City of Jackson shelter resulted in an analysis of organizational and tech-
nological emergence as situational entanglements, consisting of three main 
elements: a salient moment in time, key actors, and boundary-making prac-
tices. The entanglement process showed how key actors’ responses to salient 
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moments in time enacted both distinction and dependency between organi-
zational and technological actors. These boundary-making practices defined 
the situation at the shelter, resulting in a divided organization.
In this section, I discuss the implications of situational entanglement for 
theory and practice. First, I discuss the implications of situational entangle-
ment for extending existing theories of organizational and technological 
emergence. Situational entanglement extends existing emergent theoretical 
approaches by showing how organization and technology are situationally 
organized and how emergence occurs through the (in)determinacy of mean-
ing. Next, I discuss the implications of situational entanglement for disaster 
response practice. Situational entanglement provides disaster managers guid-
ance to assess the value of different actors and the success and failure of 
technology during a response.
Implications for Theories of Organizational  
and Technological Emergence
Theory on the emergence of organization and technology have difficulties 
accounting for the unpredictability of disaster response and crisis situations. 
These difficulties stem, in part, from assumptions about what constitutes an 
organization and a technology. Scholars have conceptualized organizations as 
stable entities or as routine organizational practices. Scholars have concep-
tualized technologies as parts of enduring sociomaterial assemblages 
(Orlikowski, 2007) or as technological affordances connected to stable fea-
tures of a technology (Leonardi, 2007).
The situational boundary-making approach offered a different set of assump-
tions about organization and technology. Namely, the situational focus con-
nected organizational practices and technologies to salient moments in time. 
The City of Jackson situational entanglement showed how organizational prac-
tices occurred as responsiveness, or lack thereof, to initial extraordinary situa-
tional demands and later compounded situational demands. Technologies were 
situational agencies, constituting responsive practices in the initial extraordi-
nary demands, but later creating the compounded situational demand.
The situational focus extends theory on emergence in organizational tech-
nology studies by showing how organization and technology are situationally 
organized, occurring in relation to the moment (Schatzki, 2006). Situationally 
organized practice is significant because it provides a logic for a more fluid 
conceptualization of both organization and technology. The implication is 
that organizations are conceptualized as sets of continuously changing 
relationships between actors, such that loosely affiliated relationships 
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constitute a proper analytic focus rather than an organizational entity or 
set of routine practices. Technologies are conceptualized as situational agen-
cies, such that the response of technology in the moment constitutes a proper 
analytic focus rather than a technological affordance (Leonardi, 2007) or 
sociomaterial assemblage (Orlikowski, 2007). This approach is important 
for organizational technology scholars as emerging technologies and new 
forms of organization become increasingly prominent in organizational life.
Theory on the emergence of organization and technology also have diffi-
culties accounting for the unpredictability of disaster response and crisis situ-
ations because of assumptions about how emergence occurs. Emergence 
occurs through organizational members patterned uses of technology over 
time, which is theorized as recurrence in practice (Leonardi, 2007), or as the 
sedimentation of organizational meaning into a technological apparatus, 
which is theorized as sociomaterial practice (Orlikowski, 2007). Both 
approaches assume a stability of organizational practice that cannot be taken 
for granted in disaster response and crisis situations.
The situational boundary-making approach offered a different assumption 
for how emergence occurred. Namely, the boundary-making focus assumed 
emergence occurred through the inclusion and exclusion of organizational 
and technological actors. The City of Jackson situational entanglement 
showed how reactive volunteers became distinct from responsive volunteers 
early in the response. Later in the response, as volunteers became more 
dependent on fixing responsive technologies, these technologies and respon-
sive volunteers co-emerged to gain control of the situation at the shelter. The 
result was an emergent organization marked by a divide between defining 
actors and isolated actors.
The boundary-making focus extends existing theory on emergence in 
organizational technology studies by showing how emergence occurs 
through the (in)determinacy of meaning. In other words, inclusion and 
determinacy of meaning are always accompanied by exclusion and inde-
terminancy of meaning (Barad, 2007). Emergence through the (in)deter-
minancy of meaning is significant because it provides a logic for 
conceptualizing emergence as a process characterized by both organiza-
tion and disorganization. The implication is that rather than assuming 
meaning is inherent to an organizational or technological actor, or result-
ing from a single purposeful act, meanings are the making of boundaries 
between actors through response practices in time. This approach is impor-
tant for organizational technology scholars to understand the subtle 
dynamics of power and control that accompany an increasing dependency 
on technology in organizational life.
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Implications for Disaster Response Practice
Approaches to organizational emergence in disaster and emergency manage-
ment classified emergent organizations as having both new structures and 
nonregular tasks (Quarantelli, 1966, 1996). A situational boundary-making 
approach expands this definition by demonstrating how emergent organiza-
tions take shape. The analysis of situational entanglement at the City of Jackson 
shelter showed that three specific elements were important to explaining the 
emergent organization: salient moments in time, key actors, and boundary-
making practices. As a result, the analysis showed how different actors and 
technologies emerged in relationship to different moments in time. Ironically, 
Health Plus, the organization with the most established experience in disaster 
response scenarios, was the reactive actor, and later the most isolated actor 
at the shelter. However, actors and technologies that were responsive to the 
situation were those that were not particularly organized before the response.
Expanding the definition of emergent organization to include the process 
of how multiple elements relate has implications for the management of 
emergent organizational dynamics. This approach suggests that it is impor-
tant for disaster managers to assess continuously the value of different actors 
during a response, rather than presuming the capacity of an organization or 
actor to respond. Ironically, official organizational actors may be unorga-
nized in the situation, and so-called unorganized actors may be best equipped 
to organize in response to the changing situation. Following this expanded 
approach to organizational emergence, disaster managers might ask, “How 
should we assess the value of organizational and nonorganizational actors in 
light of changing situational circumstances?”
To manage emergent organizational dynamics in disaster response, 
technology has been depicted as either an “agent of change” or an “object of 
change.” A situational boundary-making approach overcomes the limitations 
of these approaches by showing how technology is a situational actor. As a 
situational actor, technology acts both as a response to a situation and as a 
producer of situational change, rather than a coordinating mechanism between 
organizational actors. The analysis of situational entanglement at the City of 
Jackson shelter showed how the same technology became distinctly differ-
ent at different points in time. In the initial response to extraordinary demands, 
both the evacuee intake database and the people-finding sites constituted an 
important part of the response to the situational problems that were faced at 
that moment. However, within a short period of time, both technologies 
shifted. As the database and the finding sites began to fail, they became part of 
the situational problem, rather than part of the solution.
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Approaching technology as a situational actor has implications for how 
disaster managers might assess technology success and failure in disaster 
response. This approach suggests that the success of technology should be 
dependent on how it takes shape within sets of changing relationships over 
different points in time. Because situational circumstances are constantly 
changing, disaster managers might expect technology failure as a normal 
part of disaster response practice and, as a result, prepare to respond to the 
demand that failed technology creates. Disaster response managers might 
ask, “What will inevitably occur due to failed technology in crisis situations, 
and what kind of response is needed to address these compounded situa-
tional demands?”
Conclusion
Disaster response and crisis situations challenge our understandings of 
organizational and technological emergence. This study has offered one way 
to address this challenge through the situational boundary-making approach, 
which conceptualizes emergent organization–technology relationships as situ-
ational entanglements. I have shown how situational entanglement extends 
emergent theoretical approaches by showing how organization and technol-
ogy are situationally organized and how emergence occurs through the (in)
determinacy of meaning. I have also shown that situational entanglement has 
implications for disaster managers assessment of the value of different actors 
and the success and failure of technology during a response.
This study has some limitations. First, this analysis is neither representative 
of the entire response that took place at this shelter nor is it necessarily general-
izable to other disaster response scenarios. Because this analysis reflected data 
collected from an emergent organization at a single shelter, it may exclude other 
important organizations and actors. Second, this analysis was selective in the 
organizational dynamics on which it focused. Because this analysis fore-
grounds practices and actors in the moment, it may exclude other important 
organizational dynamics such as the history or interests of organizational actors.
Despite these limitations, the implications of this study show promise for 
organizational technology and disaster response scholars who are grappling 
to understand organization and technology under volatile situational circum-
stances. In an increasingly globalized world, organizational actors have more 
dense connections, act under increased time pressure, and increasingly rely 
on technology (Fulk & DeSanctis, 1999). Future studies can utilize a situa-
tional boundary-making approach to theorize and understand the emergence 
of organization and technology under such uncertain conditions.
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Appendix
Main Parties at Shelter During Hurricane Katrina Response
Organization/group Description
National organizations
 Health Plus A volunteer-led organization guided by a 
congressional charter to provide relief to 
victims of disaster.
 Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA)
National organization charged with supporting 
citizens and first responders to ensure the 
capability to prepare for, protect against, 
respond to, recover from, and mitigate all 
hazards.
City offices
 Office of Homeland Security 
and Emergency Management 
(HSEM)
Coordinates the citywide response to large-
scale emergencies and disasters. This includes 
planning and activities for preparedness, 
response, and recovery phases of a disaster.
 City Manager’s Office Manages all of the city’s services. Also handles 
city planning and development. Many city 
departments were involved in the response.
 First responders Police, fire, and emergency services that attend 
to security and needs of evacuees during a 
response.
Technology-specific volunteers
 Communication and Technology 
Management (CTM) 
Department
Division of the city that handles the 
communication and technology infrastructure.
 University Technology Services The office for the city’s major university 
that handles the information technology 
infrastructure.
 People-Finders Project Volunteers that created a single database on 
missing evacuees from different information 
sources on the Web using open-source 
technologies.
 Individual technology 
volunteers 
Members of the community who worked as 
technology volunteers at the intake tables 
and public computers at the shelter.
 Vendor technology volunteers Local and multinational high-tech firms that 
donated computing and telephone equipment 
to the shelter.
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Notes
1. This is a pseudonym.
2. I use the term “relational agency” to denote that agency is theorized as shared 
among heterogeneous actors. There is significant variation in how shared agency 
has been theorized, from the acknowledgment that technologies have a “material 
agency” (Pickering, 1995) to the recognition of technology as an agency in its 
own right (Barad, 2007; Latour, 2005). I simply start with the assumption that 
agency is always shared among actors.
3. I seek to highlight the exclusionary nature of practice that is fundamental to 
Barad’s (2007) approach yet underemphasized in existing constitutive entangle-
ment approaches.
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